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STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS & THE RISE OF FEDERALISM BY
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INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 2010 President Barack Obama signed the Patient
1
Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter “ACA”) into law.
The enactment of the ACA was an enormous step in the history of
the United States, as “no prior administration had successfully
pushed national health reform through Congress, despite several at2
tempts.” The Act was created with the primary goal of providing all
American citizens with quality, affordable healthcare while also establishing mechanisms to curb the unsustainable growth of healthcare
3
costs in the United States.
In order to achieve one of its main objectives—the expansion of
healthcare coverage to currently uninsured citizens—the ACA contains provisions that extend Medicaid to all individuals earning less
4
than 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). The act also provides
subsidies, through healthcare exchanges, to Americans earning between 133% and 400% of the FPL, without access to affordable em5
ployer-sponsored health insurance. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that these provisions, along with others such as the
“minimal essential coverage provision” or “individual mandate,” will
increase the number of individuals with coverage by thirty-two million
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before the year 2019, 6 with approximately seventeen million individ7
uals obtaining insurance through the Medicaid expansion.
Predictably, not all Americans were enthusiastic about the passage
8
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Very soon after
the ACA was signed into law, states began challenging the Act’s con9
stitutionality. Among these challenges, certain states contended that
the ACA, which required states to expand Medicaid or lose all federal
Medicaid funding, compelled them to implement a federal program
in violation of both the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amend10
11
ment. Even though the language of the ACA is nonobligatory, the
“importance of federal Medicaid funding in a typical state’s budget
means that states have little choice but to implement the [ACA’s]
changes to Medicaid.” 12
These constitutional challenges moved through the federal courts
and were eventually resolved by the United States Supreme Court in
13
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. In Sebelius, the
14
Court upheld the ACA’s “individual mandate” but ruled that the
Medicaid expansion violated the Spending Clause of the Constitution
since states really had no choice but to accept the expanded Medi15
caid funding. Thus, the Court ruled, new federal expansion funding could be withheld from the states that do not expand Medicaid,
but Medicaid funding already being provided could not be taken
16
away. The Court’s decision in Sebelius effectively left the choice of
17
whether to expand Medicaid entirely with the individual states.
While the Court’s decision in Sebelius may be viewed as a triumph of
federalism, the decision has created potentially devastating problems
for the ACA.
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AM MED. ASS’N ADVOCACY RES. CTR., ISSUE BRIEF: MEDICAID EXPANSION (2013), http://
www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/arc/medicaid-expansion-issue-brief.pdf.
Joondeph, supra note 2, at 447.
Id.
Id. at 448.
H.R. Con. Res. 3590, 111th Cong. (2011) (enacted) (describing a state as an expansion state “if [ the state] offers health benefits coverage statewide to parents and
nonpregnant, childless adults whose income is at least 100% of the poverty line.”
Further, a state will not be considered an expansion state if the state only offers
“health benefits coverage to parents or nonpregnant childless adults.”).
Joondeph, supra note 2, at 448.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2662–66.
Id.
Id.
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As of February 18, 2015, twenty-two states had not yet decided
whether they would expand Medicaid, with nineteen states leaning
18
against expansion. The failure of these states to expand their Medicaid programs would leave approximately six million people, who
were initially expected to gain coverage under the ACA, without any
19
means of obtaining affordable healthcare. Thus, after Sebelius, securing affordable, quality coverage for all Americans will likely not be
possible.
This Comment seeks to examine the alternative methods of a select group of states which have, or are considering, “opting-out” of
the Medicaid expansion, plan to employ as a means of providing
health coverage to their uninsured poor citizens. The Comment will
begin, in Part I, with a brief discussion of the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion and the early state challenges to this provision’s constitutionality.
Part II will contain a discussion of the Supreme Court’s resolution of
these challenges in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius. Parts III through V will then focus on the alternative programs proposed by Arkansas, Iowa, and Pennsylvania and whether
these programs are an effective means of insuring low-income individuals. Further, the propriety and fairness of certain states’ decision
not to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, while also declin20
ing to negotiate an alternate plan through a § 1115 waiver, will be
evaluated. The Sebelius decision’s overall impact on the success of the
ACA will also be discussed. Finally, the Comment will conclude, in
Part VI, with a discussion of “federalism by waiver” in the realm of
cooperative federal and state programs in the aftermath of Sebelius.
I. THE MEDICAID EXPANSION & STATES’ CHALLENGES
Medicaid was created under Title XIX of the Social Security Act
and became law in 1965 as a joint venture between the federal and
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See Wher e the Stat es Stand on M edi caid Ex pans ion : 2 8 S tates , D.C . Ex pandin g
M edi caid , T H E A D V I S O R Y B D . C O . (Feb. 11, 2015 11:47 AM), http://www.
advisory.com/daily-briefing/resources/primers/medicaidmap
See KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM: A GUIDE TO THE SUPREME
COURT’S DECISION ON THE ACA’S MEDICAID EXPANSION 3 (Aug. 2012), available at
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8347.pdf.
Section 1115 Demonstrations, MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIPProgram-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/Section-1115-Demonstrations.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2014) (explaining that § 1115 demonstration waivers “give the
Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to approve experimental, pilot, or
demonstration projects that promote the objectives of the Medicaid and CHIP programs”).
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state governments. 21 Within a broad framework, established through
the passage of federal statutes, regulations, and policies, “each State
establishes its own eligibility standards; determines the type, amount,
duration, and scope of services; sets the rate of payment for services;
22
Medicaid was specifically deand administers its own program.”
signed in this manner to give states extensive flexibility in administrating their particular Medicaid programs, and, as a result, there exists a great deal of variation in eligibility requirements, even among
23
Therefore, an individstates of similar size or geographic location.
ual who is eligible for Medicaid benefits in one state may not be eligible to receive those benefits in another state or may observe drastic
24
differences in the “amount, duration, or scope of services provided.”
There are, however, federal guidelines that limit a state’s ability to
deny Medicaid coverage to certain “categorically needy” groups of
25
people or restrict the coverage of certain medical services. In order
for a state to receive federal Medicaid funding, which comprises over
26
20% of the average state’s total expenditures, a state is required to
27
provide coverage to such groups. These groups with mandatory eligibility include pregnant women, children, adults with dependent
28
children, people with disabilities, and seniors.
There are also “medically needy” groups of individuals to which
states have the option of extending coverage and will receive federal
21
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BARBARA S. KLEES, CHRISTIAN J. WOLFE & CATHERINE A. CURTIS, DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, BRIEF
SUMMARIES OF MEDICARE & MEDICAID: TITLE XVIII AND TITLE XIX OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT AS OF NOVEMBER 1, 2009, at 18 (Nov. 1, 2009), available at http://www.
cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/Medicare
ProgramRatesStats/downloads/MedicareMedicaidSummaries2009.pdf.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18, 23 (explaining that limited income families with children under age six
whose family income is at or below 133% of the FPL, pregnant women whose family
income is below 133% of the FPL, infants born to Medicaid-eligible women for the
first year of life with certain restrictions, Supplemental Security Income Recipients,
recipients of adoption or foster care assistance under Title IV-E of the Social Security
Act, special protected groups, all children under age 19 in families with incomes at
or below the FPL, and certain Medicare beneficiaries are all categorically needy).
CTR. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES & GEORGETOWN HEALTH POLICY INST., MEDICAID AND
STATE BUDGETS: LOOKING AT THE FACTS 1–2 (Mar. 2011), a v a i la b l e a t http://ccf.
georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Medicaid%20and%
20state%20budgets-2011.pdf.
See KLEES, WOLFE & CURTIS, supra note 2 1 , at 18–20.
See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID AT-A-GLANCE 2005: A MEDICAID
INFORMATION SOURCE 1 (2005), available at http://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archiveddownloads/MedicaidGenInfo/downloads/medicaidataglance2005.pdf.
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matching funds for doing so. 29 If, however, a state elects to extend
coverage to the “medically needy,” there are federal requirements
mandating that certain groups and certain services be included as
30
part of such coverage.
Prior to the passage of the ACA, an individual would have to be31
long to one of the aforementioned “categorically needy” groups, or
in certain states a “medically needy” group, and meet a state32
established financial test to qualify for Medicaid. The income
threshold for pregnant women and children was set by the federal
government to be no less than 133% of the FPL. 33 For other individuals, however, that threshold can be, and in many states is, much lower. For seventeen states, the Medicaid eligibility level for parents with
dependent children was set at or below 50% of the FPL, which is
34
$11,670 for a family of four. In another seventeen states, the Medicaid eligibility level for parents with dependent children was still set
35
below 100% of the FPL, or $23,850 for a family of four. In states
with more restrictive Medicaid programs, as many as 55% of individuals living below 100% of the FPL are left without any form of health
36
insurance.
As the ACA was written, almost every United States citizen under
the age of sixty-five with an income below 133% of the FPL would
qualify for Medicaid. Further, the Act provides “that the federal government will pay 100% of the costs of covering these newly eligible
37
individuals through 2016.” After that period expires, the federal
government will gradually reduce its payment level to no lower than
38
90%.
Thus, the ACA anticipates very significant changes to the
Medicaid programs of states with less generous Medicaid enrollment
requirements.
The Medicaid expansion is a crucial element of the ACA, as one
of the Act’s primary goals is to achieve near universal helathcare coverage in the United States. After the ACA’s implementation, roughly
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See KLEES, WOLFE & CURTIS, supra note 2 1 , at 20.
Id.
Id. at 18–20.
Id.
Id.
Medicaid and CHIP Eligibility Table by State, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
(2015)
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/medicaid-eligibility-table-by-state-stateactivist.aspx
Id.
Id.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1)(E) (2013).
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thirty-two million people were expected to acquire affordable, quality
39
health insurance. While these individuals are expected to obtain
40
healthcare through a variety of the ACA’s provisions, nearly seventeen-million of the newly insured individuals were projected to gain
41
These provisions,
coverage through the expansion of Medicaid.
which are largely just expansions and alterations of health insurance
structures already in place in the United States, left policy makers
very hopeful that universal healthcare coverage, thought to be crucial
to the well-being of a citizenry in many nations, would finally be a re42
ality in the United States. This optimism was, however, short-lived.
On March 23, 2011, the day President Obama signed the ACA into
law, Florida and twelve other states brought a lawsuit that challenged
the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate and Medicaid
43
expansion provisions. Thirteen other states, several individuals, and
the National Federation of Independent Business subsequently
44
joined these Plaintiffs.
In Florida ex. rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health
and Human Services, plaintiffs challenged “the fundamental and ‘massive’ changes in the nature and scope of the Medicaid program” as a
45
violation of the Constitution’s Spending Clause. The plaintiffs argued that the expansion alters the Medicaid program to such an
extent that states “cannot afford the newly-imposed costs and
burdens” and that states will “have no choice but to remain in Medicaid as amended by the Act, which will eventually require them to
46
‘run their budgets off a cliff.’” The District Court for the Northern
District of Florida, in ruling that the defendant was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on the Medicaid expansion issue, held
that the costs and burdens imposed on states participating in the

39
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Emily Whelan Parento & Lawrence O. Gostin, Better Health, But Less Justice: Widening
Health Disparities After National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 27 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481, 482 (2013).
For example, the elimination of insurer discrimination on the basis of pre-existing
conditions and the creation of health insurance exchanges that pool risks. The exchanges will allow individuals earning between 134 and 400% of the FPL, and who
are unable to obtain quality employment based helathcare coverage, to purchase insurance at a reasonable price. S e e FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, supra note 1 9 , a t 2–
3.
Id. at 3.
See Parento & Gostin, supra note 3 9 , a t 4 8 2 .
See Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1263
(N.D. Fla. 2011).
Id.
Id. at 1266.
Id.
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program were not in excess of the powers granted to Congress under
the Spending Clause on a “coercion” theory, given that participation
in the Medicaid program was voluntary, that states had an option to
“opt out,” and that Congress, when it enacted the Medicaid program,
47
had expressly reserved right to alter or amend it.
The plaintiffs in Bondi then appealed the district court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In Florida ex. rel.
Attorney General v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, the plaintiff states revived their argument that an additional
restriction on Congress’s spending power, one that incorporates
the Tenth Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states
and prevents Congress from “employ[ing] the spending power in
such a way as to ‘coerce’ the states into compliance with [a] federal
48
objective,” should be added. While the Eleventh Circuit recognized
that there is a point where restrictions on a state’s ability to
use grants of federal funding could be so burdensome as to
prevent the state from having any real choice but to participate in
49
“optional” federal programs and thus rise to the level of coercion,
the court decided that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion was not unduly coercive under relevant precedent. 50 Florida ex. rel. Attorney General
was not, however, the end of the matter. Plaintiffs successfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, and the Court agreed to review the lowers courts’ decisions as to the constitutionality of both
51
the Medicaid expansion and the individual mandate.
III.NATIONAL FEDERATION OF INDEPENDENT BUSINESS V. SEBELIUS
Although all circuit courts were in agreement that the Medicaid
expansion did not amount to coercion, and “[n]o lower court had
52
declared the Medicaid expansion unconstitutional,” the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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Id. at 1268.
Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1264 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d at 1267.
Id.
See Fla. e x . R e l . A t t ’ y G e n . v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 6 4 8 F . 3 d
1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert granted, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011)
(No. 11-400).
Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30 (2013).
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A. The States’ Argument
The States’ argument against the Medicaid expansion focused
heavily on the perceived need to limit Congress’s spending power, as
the Spending Clause is a means by which Congress can reach beyond
53
its specifically enumerated powers. According to the States, “if this
Medicaid expansion [does] not cross the line into coercion, ‘no Act
54
Thus, the States’ challenges focused on the
of Congress ever will.’”
constitutionality of the expansion based on both the Spending
55
56
Clause and the Tenth Amendment.
B. The United States’s Argument
The United States first argued for the Medicaid expansion’s constitutionality by citing Congress’s history of broad authority under the
Spending Clause to “fix the terms on which it shall disburse federal
57
money to the [S]tates.” The United States cited numerous instances
where Congress has mandated expansions of categories of individuals
58
and benefits covered by Medicaid. The United States then challenged the logic of the states’ coercion claim, which was based on the
idea that the amount of federal funding that could be withheld from
the states was so substantial as to leave the states with no choice but to
59
The United States noted that Petiparticipate in the expansion.
tioners’ argument would support the peculiar proposition that the
Medicaid expansion would have been more coercive if Congress had
60
instead opted to indefinitely fund all of its costs.

53
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See Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 40–41 (c i ti n g Nat’l Fed’n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2 6 4 2 ( 2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)) (recognizing that Congress has not unlimited spending
power because of the power imbalance that can result from unlimited funding).
Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 32–33 (quoting Reply Brief of State
Petitioners on Medicaid at 10, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-393)). The states argued that the ACA is coercive since Congress
threatened to withhold all federal Medicaid funding from states unwilling to participate in the expansion and did not provide states with an alternative means of insuring their low-income citizens.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
U.S. CONST. amend X.
Brief for Respondents at 15, Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Services, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-400) (hereinafter Brief for Respondents).
Id. at 26–27.
Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 35.
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 57, at 41 (arguing that had Congress decided to
fund state Medicaid programs entirely, but conditioned their funding grant on expansion, the portion of funding withheld from non-expanding states would be im-
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C. The Supreme Court’s Plurality Opinion
On June 28, 2012, roughly two years after President Barack
Obama signed the ACA into law, a plurality of the Supreme Court,
led by Chief Justice John Roberts, found the Medicaid expansion to
61
be unconstitutionally coercive.
Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by explaining that the
Supreme Court has “long recognized that Congress may use [its power under the Spending Clause] to grant federal funds to the States,
and may condition such a grant upon the States’ ‘taking certain ac62
tions that Congress could not [otherwise] require them to take.’”
This power implies that Congress can monitor the states’ use of federal funds to make sure they “provide for the . . . general Welfare” 63
in the manner Congress intended when it granted states the funding. 64
Chief Justice Roberts then cautioned that the Court has recognized limits on Congress’s spending power when such power is used
to secure state compliance with federal objectives, as “the Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability
to require the States to govern according to Congress’[s] instruc65
tions.” If Congress’s spending power were not limited, federalism
66
and thus individual liberty, could be compromised.
Chief Justice Roberts clarified that Spending Clause programs do
not present a danger to federalism when states are given a legitimate
choice whether to accept the federal conditions, so that holding state
67
officials politically accountable for their decisions would be fair.
When, however, the state is left with no real choice but to accept the
funding grant’s conditions, the federal government can avoid political accountability while still accomplishing goals it could not accom68
plish directly through employment of its enumerated powers.

61

62
63
64
65
66
67
68

mense and would, according to the states’ logic, be significantly more coercive than
the terms of the ACA’s expansion).
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601–08 (2012) (assessing
the constitutionality of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and finding it coercive, thereby
violating the limits of the Spending Clause).
Id. at 2601 (quoting College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999)).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
Id. (internal citations omitted) ( quoting New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992)).
See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
Id.
See id. at 2603.
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Applying this reasoning to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion provision, the Court held that the threatened loss of over 20% of the average state’s budget constituted the very threat to federalism that limits
on Congress’s spending power are necessary to prevent. Further, the
United States’s argument that the expansion is merely a modification
of the existing Medicaid program, which the States agreed Congress
69
could alter when they “signed on in the first place,” was rejected.
Rather, the expansion “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree” since the Medicaid program under the ACA was transformed
into a program designed to meet the healthcare needs of all individuals earning below 133% of the FPL. 70 Thus, Medicaid “is no longer a
program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of
a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
71
coverage.”
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts held that, while “Congress is not
free . . . to penalize States that choose not to participate in [the] new
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding,” the other
reforms enacted by Congress under the ACA “will remain fully operative . . . and will still function in a way consistent with Congress’s basic
72
This portion of the plurality
objectives in enacting the statute.”
opinion operated to save the ACA as a whole by rejecting the idea
that the Medicaid expansion was necessary for the individual mandate to function.
While the Court may have saved the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as a whole, the designation of the Medicaid expansion as unconstitutional will likely operate to hamper the effectiveness of the Act. For the states that ultimately decide not to
participate in the expansion, vulnerable citizens will be left without
any means of obtaining affordable healthcare. Thus, low state participation in the expansion will directly counter the ACA’s objectives
and leave large gaps in helathcare coverage throughout the United
States. Unless states are able to devise effective alternatives to expanding their Medicaid programs, the ACA’s primary goal of providing quality healthcare to all Americans will likely prove infeasible.

69
70
71

72

Id. at 2605.
Id. at 2606.
Id.
Id. at 2607–08.

Apr. 2015]

NFIB’S IMPACT ON STATE MEDICAID

1235

III. ALTERNATE STATE PLANS
As of February 18, 2015, twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia had decided to participate in the ACA’s Medicaid expan73
sion.
Fifteen states had declined to participate, and seven states—
Alaska, Missouri, Montana, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyo74
ming—are presently undecided. Unfortunately, many of the states
that have decided not to expand Medicaid are amongst the least gen75
erous in terms of their Medicaid eligibility requirements.
For seventeen states, most of which have decided not to participate in the expansion, Medicaid eligibility levels for parents with de76
pendent children were set at or below 50% of the FPL. In another
seventeen states that have also largely declined participation or are
undecided eligibility levels for parents with dependent children were
77
set below 100% of the FPL. And, in almost all of these states, enrollees must belong to certain categorical groups to be eligible for Med78
icaid. Thus, childless adults without disabilities are almost entirely
ineligible for Medicaid’s assistance.
There may, however, be a viable alternative to expanding Medicaid according to the ACA’s terms. This alternative, which a handful
of states have pursued, involves negotiation with the federal government so that states can use Medicaid funding to provide healthcare to
their low-income citizens without enrolling them directly in Medi79
caid. his Part seeks to examine the select group of states that have
decided to provide healthcare for low-income citizens on terms that
are different from those of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
As of February 18, 2015, Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania have all proposed using federal Medicaid funds to pur73

74
75

76
77
78

79

Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://
kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordablecare-act/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
Id.
See generally A N N E T T E B . R A M I R E Z D E A R E L L A N O & S I D N E Y M .
W O L F E , PUB. CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GRP., UNSETTLING SCORES: A RANKING OF
STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS 19 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
2007UnsettlingScores.pdf.
Id.
Id.
Id.
MaryBeth Musumeci, Medicaid Expansion Through Marketplace Premium Assistance, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaidexpansion-through-marketplace-premium-assistance/ (explaining that premium assistance proposals are a means by which states can retain federal Medicaid funding, but
use such funding to provide private health insurance to newly eligible Medicaid enrollees under the ACA).
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chase private coverage for individuals who would be newly eligible for
80
Medicaid under the ACA. All of these states have had their § 1115
81
demonstration waivers approved by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, but Pennsylvania’s newly elected governor may opt
82
for a state plan amendment. The Arkansas, Iowa, and Pennsylvania
plans are discussed more fully in the following Parts. The alternate
plans of Indiana and Michigan, while containing some differences,
are substantially similar to the state plans described below.
A. The Arkansas Plan
On September 27, 2013, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services notified Arkansas state officials that it had approved Arkan83
sas’ alternate expansion plan. Arkansas applied for a § 1115 waiver
so that the roughly 200,000 Arkansas citizens who became eligible for
Medicaid under the ACA could purchase individual plans from the
healthcare marketplace, rather than being enrolled in the state’s
84
Medicaid program.
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives the Secretary of
85
Health and Human Services “wide latitude” to approve experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that promote the objectives
86
Speof the Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance programs.
80

81

82

83

84
85

86

Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga & MaryBeth Musumeci, The ACA and Recent Section
1115 Medicaid Demonstration Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/issuebrief/the-aca-and-recent-section-1115-medicaid-demonstration-waivers/ (last visited Feb. 15,
2015).
Section 1115 Demonstrations, supra note 20 (explaining that “Section 1115 of the Social
Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services authority to approve
experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects that promote the objectives of the
Medicaid and CHIP programs. The purpose of these demonstrations, which give
States additional flexibility to design and improve their programs, is to demonstrate
and evaluate policy approaches.”).
Robin Rudowitz, Samantha Artiga, and Marybeth Musumeci, The ACA and Medicaid Expansion Waivers, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-aca-andmedicaid-expansion-waivers/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015); Kate Giammarise, Wolf Begins
Dismantling Healthy PA in Favor of Medicaid, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.post-gazette.com/local/region/2015/02/09/Wolf-announces-plans-torevamp-states-Medicaid-plan/stories/201502090152.
Sarah Kliff, Arkansas is Using This Weird Trick to Expand Medicaid, WASH. POST WONKBLOG
( Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09 /
27/arkansas-is-using-this-weird-trick-to-expand-medicaid/.
Id.
Theodore W. Ruger, Health Policy Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the Affordable
Care Act, in THE HELATHCARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS, 367 (Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds.,
2013).
Section 1115 Demonstrations, supra note 20.
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cifically, § 1115 provides that “the Secretary may waive compliance
with any of the requirements of [the Act] to the extent and for the
period he finds necessary to enable a state to carry out any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which the Secretary believes
87
These
is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of the Act.”
§ 1115 demonstrations must be budget-neutral so that federal Medicaid expenditures do not exceed federal spending absent the waiv88
er.
In Arkansas, the alternate expansion program is not expected
to cost the federal government any more than a traditional expan89
sion, and the alternate program is set to continue for three years.
When the agreement expires, either the Centers for Medicaid and
Medicare Services (“CMS”) or Arkansas can decide whether it would
like to renew the premium assistance program. 90
The Arkansas plan will cover all newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries between the ages of nineteen and sixty, parents earning between 17% and 138% of the FPL, and childless adults earning be91
tween 0% and 138% of the FPL. For these individuals, enrollment
92
in the premium assistance program will be mandatory.
93
The medically frail will be exempt from the program but may
94
opt in if they choose. Under the Arkansas plan, wraparound benefits, which supplement private insurance plans that offer fewer bene-

87
88
89
90
91

92

93

94

Ruger, supra note 85 (internal quotations omitted).
See Musumeci, supra note 79 (discussing the requirement of cost-effectiveness in premium
assistance programs).
Id.
Kliff, supra note 83.
See Musumeci, supra note 79, a t Fig. 2 (showing the eligible Medicaid beneficiaries
for the Arkansas plan); Medicaid Expansion in Arkansas, KAISER FAMILY FOUND.,
http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/medicaid-expansion-in-arkansas/ (last visited Mar.
28, 2015)
See Musumeci, supra note 79 (explaining that because Arkansas and the other states
following the premium assistance model have made enrollment mandatory, 1115
waivers are necessary before the plans can be implemented).
See 42 C.F.R. § 440.315(f) (2013) (allowing the states to define medically frail but
mandating that the category include “ children with serious emotional disturbances,
individuals with disabling mental disorders, individuals with serious and complex
medical conditions, and individuals with physical and/or mental disabilities that significantly impair their ability to perform one or more activities of daily living”); see
also KRISTEN JENSEN & NANCY KIRCHNER, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
MEDICAID HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FINAL RULE: ALTERNATIVE BENEFIT PLANS AND ESSENTIAL
HEALTH BENEFITS 11 (July 9, 2013), available at http://www.medicaid.gov/StateResource-Center/Eligibility-Enrollment-Final-Rule/Alternative-Benefit-Plans-andEssential-Health-Benefits.pdf (explaining that people with substance abuse disorders
are included in the definition of medically frail).
See Musumeci, supra note 79 (explaining how the medically frail will be exempt from the
program unless they opt in).
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fits than Medicaid, will be provided on a fee-for-service basis. 95 Further, Arkansas anticipates developing a pilot project with health sav96
ings accounts for new beneficiaries in 2015 and 2016. The state also
plans to amend its waiver to extend coverage to parents earning less
97
than 17% of the FPL, and to children, by the year 2016.
Individuals who qualify for Arkansas’s premium assistance plan
will be able to choose between at least two “high value silver level”
98
quality health plans in the marketplace. If qualified individuals do
not choose a plan, one will be assigned to them, and automatically as99
signed enrollees will then have thirty days to change their plan. Automatic assignment will be based on “target minimum market shares”
of beneficiaries in each quality health program in the applicable re100
gion.
Arkansas will pay monthly premiums directly to the quality health
plans for premium assistance enrollees, and beneficiaries will not be
101
Beneficiaries will, however, be
responsible for any premium costs.
102
responsible for cost sharing of up to 5% of their annual income.
For beneficiaries earning between 100% and 138% of the FPL, costsharing will be consistent with Medicaid and marketplace quality
103
There will be no cost-sharing for beneficiaries
health plan rules.
earning below 100% of the FPL in 2014, but Arkansas’s waiver application indicates that cost-sharing for individuals earning between
104
50% and 100% of the FPL will be introduced in 2015 and 2016.
There will be no cost sharing for individuals who are exempted
105
Individuals enrolled in a quality
under federal Medicaid law.
health plan under Arkansas’s premium assistance program will receive health benefits identical to those received by Arkansas citizens
106
enrolled in the state’s Medicaid program.

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (describing the amount of time that automatic enrollees will have to change
their plans).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (stating timing of when costs haring will take place for certain the poverty level categories).
Id.
Id.
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B. The Iowa Plan
Iowa’s § 1115 waiver was approved on December 10, 2013. 107 The
state’s premium assistance plan will cover newly eligible Medicaid
beneficiaries earning between 100% and 138% of the FPL who do
108
not have cost-effective employer-sponsored insurance. Beneficiaries
earning up to 100% of the FPL will be covered through Medicaid
managed care arrangements approved under another § 1115 demon109
stration. As in Arkansas, enrollment in a quality health plan will be
mandatory for all § 1115 demonstration beneficiaries with an exception for the medically frail. 110 American Indians and Alaskan natives
can also voluntarily opt-out of the premium assistance program. 111
Premium assistance beneficiaries will choose between at least two
silver level plans in the healthcare marketplace and may choose from
112
Further, the
all silver plans available in their geographic region.
113
§ 1115 waiver quality health plans must offer 100% actuarial value.
This means that the plan must cover 100% of an enrollee’s
healthcare expenses, even though silver plans for individuals not eligible to participate in Iowa’s premium assistance program will have
114
Once enrolled in a quality health
an actuarial value of only 70%.
plan, premium assistance enrollees must remain enrolled for twelve
115
months.
Unlike beneficiaries in Arkansas, who pay no premiums, all premium assistance beneficiaries in Iowa will pay monthly premiums that
116
These precannot exceed 2% of their annual household income.
miums “will be waived for the first year of enrollment and may be
waived in subsequent years if beneficiaries complete specified ‘health
117
improvement activities.’”
Beneficiaries will have a ninety-day grace
period to pay past-due premiums before Medicaid eligibility will be
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

115
116
117

Id.
Id.
See id. (stating a category of individuals that will be covered through the Medicaid
managed care arrangement).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Focus on Health Reform: What the Actuarial Values in the Affordable Care Act Mean, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (April 2011), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/what-theactuarial-values-in-the-affordable/ (describing actuarial values for different tiers of coverage, including a silver plan with a 70% actuarial value).
See Musumeci, supra note 79 (stating the amount of time that premium assistance enrollees must remain enrolled).
Id.
Id.
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terminated. 118 As in Arkansas, there will be cost sharing for benefi119
There will also be copays
ciaries limited to 5% of annual income.
for Iowa beneficiaries who rely on emergency rooms for non120
emergency purposes.
The benefits provided to premium assistance enrollees must “be
121
at least equivalent to state employee plan benefits package[s].”
Further, in Iowa, dental benefits will be provided to enrollees
122
“through a capitated commercial dental plan carve-out.”
C. The Proposed Pennsylvania Plan
Former Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Corbett submitted a
123
The proposal,
§ 1115 waiver application on February 19, 2014.
124
which spans over 100 pages, was approved on August 28, 2014.
Pennsylvania’s demonstration, like the approved § 1115 waiver programs in Arkansas, Iowa, Indiana, and Michigan, would use federal
funds to cover citizens through the marketplace created under the
125
ACA rather than expanding state Medicaid rolls.
The “Healthy
126
Pennsylvania” plan would cover all newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four and all parents
127
Newly eligible nineearning between 33% and 138% of the FPL.
teen and twenty year olds would be covered through Medicaid man128
aged care.
The plan provides essential health benefits based on
129
the small group plan with the largest enrollment benchmark.
As in Arkansas and Iowa, enrollment in private health insurance is
mandatory for all Pennsylvania citizens who qualify, with the medical130
ly frail being exempt.
There is also an additional eligibility re118
119
120
121
122
123
124

125
126

127
128
129
130

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Medical Assistance Bulletin (Nov. 4, 2014), available at http://
www.dpw.state.pa.us/cs/groups/webcontent/documents/bulletin_admin/c_116644.pdf.
Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Healthy Pennsylvania 1115 Demonstration Application
(Feb. 2014), available at http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/cs/groups/webcontent/documents/
document/c_071204.pdf.
See Musumeci, supra note 79.
Thomas Corbett, Healthy PA: Access, Affordability, Quality (Apr. 3, 2014), available at
http://www.pennsylvaniaoralhealth.org/important-articles-pages/2014/4/3/healthy-paaccess-affordability-quality.
See Musumeci, supra note 7 9 .
Id.
Id.
Id.
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quirement in Pennsylvania mandating that all “able-bodied” adults
register with the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and actively en131
gage in work search or job training activities.
Furthermore, in order to maintain Medicaid eligibility, enrollees are required to complete twelve approved work search activities during the first six
132
The approved Healthy Pennsylvania plan
months of enrollment.
133
includes premiums for enrollees on an income-based sliding scale.
The premiums can, however, be reduced by a maximum of 50% if
enrollees engage in certain “healthy behavior and work search activities.” 134 Enrollees in the Healthy Pennsylvania plan face termination
of benefits if premiums remain unpaid for three consecutive
135
months. Cost sharing is also required for all non-emergency use of
136
the emergency room.
IV.

EVALUATION

The premium assistance plans will likely provide non-expanding
states with the same benefits realized by expanding states, while still
furthering the objectives of the ACA. Although the Arkansas, Iowa,
Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania plans are not technically Medicaid expansions, since individuals will be directed to the marketplace
rather than enrolled directly in Medicaid, the overall effect on health
insurance coverage will be substantially the same.
For states like Tennessee and Wyoming, which view the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion as politically infeasible, but are looking for ways
to provide healthcare to the vulnerable residents, the premium assis137
tance plans may be a viable option. The market-based premium assistance plans have a much greater degree of acceptance among Republican lawmakers who oppose expanding traditional Medicaid
programs but are willing to pursue a free-market approach to
138
Further, since CMS has already demonstrated a willhelathcare.
ingness to allow states to experiment with premium assistance plans
through § 1115 waivers, such plans may be the only way to ensure that
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

138

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Christine Vestal, More States Lean Toward Medicaid Expansion, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 28,
2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/28/states-medicaid-expansion_n_
6563586.html.
See Premium Assistance in Medicaid,
HEALTH AFFAIRS (June
6, 2013),
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=94.
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vulnerable populations obtain health coverage in states opposed to
139
the ACA’s expansion.
The premium assistance plans also have benefits beyond political
140
acceptance by conservative lawmakers.
First, since the plans provide newly eligible beneficiaries with commercial insurance, plan enrollees may have access to primary care physicians, specialists, and
141
hospitals that do not participate in the Medicaid program. Further,
providing commercial health coverage rather than coverage through
Medicaid “could allow people whose incomes fluctuate to more easily
142
“Curmove from full Medicaid to a federally subsidized policy.”
rently, many patients face gaps and variation in their coverage as
changes in their income force them in and out of Medicaid and the
143
private insurance market.”
A study done by George Washington University found that individuals who retained Medicaid coverage for a year paid approximate144
ly $333 a month in Medicaid bills. Patients who remained covered
145
for only one month, however, paid roughly $625 a month. Thus, in
the absence of continuity of coverage, individuals are “less likely to
get the preventive care and chronic disease management they need
146
to stay healthy and keep costs down.” Under a premium assistance
model, the same carrier may offer Medicaid and commercial health
147
coverage plans with the same network of doctors and hospitals.
Thus, the discontinuity of care that can lead to increased costs could
be largely eliminated. Such an approach can also lead to administrative savings for states since individuals will not need to enroll in a
plan with a different provider network if their income rises. 148
Finally, commercial coverage for newly eligible enrollees could
“jumpstart competition among commercial insurance carriers and
give states more sway over these companies and medical providers

139
140

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id.
Christine Vestal, Obama Administration Poised to Approve Arkansas-Style Medicaid Expansions,
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS STATELINE ( M a y 6 , 2 0 1 3 ) , http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2013/05/06/obama-administration-poised-toapprove-arkansasstyle-medicaid-expansions.
Id.
Id.
Premium Assistance in Medicaid, supra note 138, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. (“If Medicaid beneficiaries can enroll in an exchange plan up front, they won’t
have to move into a plan with a different provider network if their income rises.”).
Id.
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who serve Medicaid patients and other low-income adults.” 149 This is
because the new exchanges may be able to “aggregate the purchasing
power of individuals and small groups and extend system reforms be150
yond Medicaid.”
These premium assistance plans may not, however, be cost effective for participating states initially. The Congressional Budget Office
estimated that providing Medicaid coverage to the newly insured
151
would “cost about $6,000 per year per person.” Commercial insurance coverage, purchased through the healthcare marketplace, will
152
cost almost $9,000 per person on average.
Since the federal and state governments pay providers directly
under traditional Medicaid programs and have a large network with
which they can negotiate fees, private insurers traditionally pay pro153
viders much more than Medicaid for services.
Since the § 1115
waivers mandate that the premium assistance demonstration models
not cost the federal government more than traditional Medicaid pro154
grams, premium assistance states will be paying more to provide
coverage for newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries than states partici155
pating in the ACA’s expansion directly.
However, as the share of the expansion funding granted to the
states by the federal government is reduced and predicted cost shifts
are realized, the premium assistance plans may become more compa156
rable to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The overall cost of private
insurance and Medicaid are predicted to converge over time under
the ACA as “[i]nsurance companies interested in competing for newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries and for low-income individuals purchasing policies on the exchange may be willing to lower their pric157
The addition of millions of individuals to the Medicaid
es.”
program may also force states to increase the rates they pay
healthcare providers “to convince more doctors, dentists, pharma149
150
151
152
153

154
155
156
157

Vestal, supra note 140.
Premium Assistance in Medicaid, supra note 138, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Edwin Park, Expanding Medicaid a Less Costly Way to Cover More Low-Income Uninsured Than
Expanding Private Insurance, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (June 26, 2008),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=429.
See Musumeci, supra note 79 (detailing federal restrictions on costs and premium imposition).
See Park, supra note 153 (describing the cost savings of the ACA relative to Medicaid
through lower reimbursement rates and reduced administrative costs).
See Vestal, supra note 140 (describing the possibility of increased state costs as contributions increase).
Id.
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cists, and hospitals to serve the new patients.” 158 Further, before these
predicted changes take place, premium assistance states might be
able to “offset cost increases with savings that may come when people
can more easily move from Medicaid to subsidized insurance on the
159
Increased competition may also act to lower costs as
exchange.”
160
more individuals purchase insurance on the marketplace.
The question of states’ premium assistance models’ workability
beyond their respective trial periods still remains. As per the terms of
the ACA, the federal government will begin reducing its contribution
161
Federal
to expanded state Medicaid programs after three years.
approval of any § 1115 waiver requires that demonstration models
not cost the federal government more than traditional Medicaid pro162
grams.
Therefore, states may have trouble renewing their premium assistance agreements once federal funding contributions to the expanding states drops below 100%. If the cost saving predictions are real163
ized, and private insurance costs begin converging with the cost of
Medicaid, continuation of state premium assistance models will likely
164
be feasible. If such predictions are inaccurate or slow to occur, the
models will likely need to be reconsidered as states may be financially
unable to continue using the reduced federal subsidies to purchase
private insurance for their low-income, newly Medicaid eligible citizens.
Another concern regarding the premium assistance models is that
the alternate approach does not necessarily mean that low-income
individuals will obtain benefits equivalent to those they would have
165
The ACA
received if enrolled in a traditional Medicaid program.
158
159
160

161

162
163
164
165

Id.
Id.
See id. (“The agency [HHS] also told states that increased competition in exchanges
would occur because of the newly eligible enrollees, and that could result in lower prices.”).
42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (prescribing that the federal government will reduce its contribution to 95% for calendar quarters in 2017, 94% for calendar quarteres in 2018,
93% for calendar quarters in 2019, and 90% for calendar quarters in 2020 and into future years).
See Musumeci, supra note 79 (finding that premium assistance programs must be “costeffective” as compared to the Medicaid state plan).
See Vestal, supra note 140 (“Experts say, however, that the costs of private insurance
and Medicaid are likely to converge over time.”).
See id.
Stanton R. Mehr & Mary K. Caffrey, New Approaches to Medicaid Expansion: Hybrid Plans
Offer Alternatives for Covering More People, A M . J . MANAGED CARE (Dec. 16, 2013),
http://www.ajmc.com/publications/ebrc/2013/novdecem13/new-approaches-tomedicaid-expansion-hybrid-plans-offer-alternatives-for-covering-more-people.
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mandates that certain essential benefits be provided to all Medicaid
enrollees, but states using premium assistance models are not adding
citizens to their Medicaid roles. CMS has, however, addressed this issue in both Arkansas and Iowa by requiring that those states provide a
form of “wrap around” coverage to ensure that citizens receiving coverage under the premium assistance models obtain the same benefits
166
Furthermore, CMS has reas an individual enrolled in Medicaid.
quired that enrollees under a premium assistance model be given a
167
The
choice between at least two silver plans in the marketplace.
question of adequacy of coverage is, therefore, unlikely to be an issue
should other states decide to create their own premium assistance
models, as CMS has already expressed its unwillingness to approve
plans that offer enrollees fewer benefits than they would receive un168
der a traditional Medicaid program.
Although Medicaid benefit packages can vary tremendously from
state to state, as the use § 1115 waivers in the past has led to variations
169
in basic state Medicaid benefit packages, evidence from Arkansas
and Iowa shows that CMS will likely prevent premium assistance
models from acting to further increase benefit discrepancies among
states. The Department of Health and Human Services has also been
working with states to add additional premium payments to exchange
plans so that states pursuing a premium assistance model can simply
add on the required services to the traditional exchange package of
170
This will allow states to comply more easily with § 1115
benefits.
waiver requirements.
V. STATES NOT EXPANDING
While there may be both expected and unexpected difficulties
surrounding Arkansas, Iowa, Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania’s
premium assistance plans, these states, along with those that have decided to expand their Medicaid programs in accordance with the
ACA, will have their most vulnerable citizens insured. For states that
166
167

168

169
170

Id.
See Park, supra note 153 (“Beneficiaries choose between at least two silver level Marketplace QHPs and may choose among all silver plans available in geographic region.”).
Medicaid Expansion Through Premium Assistance: Arkansas, Iowa, and Pennsylvania’s Proposals
Compared, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 2014), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.
wordpress.com/2014/04/8463-04-medicaid-expansion-through-premium-assistancearkansas-iowa-and-pennsylvania.pdf.
See Ruger, supra note 85, at 367 (detailing the vast number of such waivers in the 1990s
and 2000s from the perspective of the federal government).
Premium Assistance in Medicaid, supra note 138.
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have chosen not to participate in the expansion and have no plans to
develop their own premium assistance models, hundreds of thousands of state citizens will remain without sufficient health insur171
ance.
As previously noted, this substantial gap in coverage could greatly
reduce the effectiveness of the ACA. In non-expanding states, the
poorest adults would remain covered by Medicaid, but to significantly
variable degrees of eligibility. 172 Some states, for example, provide
Medicaid coverage for adults only up to 17% of the FPL while other
173
states provide coverage up to, and in some states beyond, 133%.
These significant “donut hole” gaps will make universal coverage
nearly impossible, as the poorest citizens are statutorily exempt from
the individual mandate and without the financial means to purchase
health insurance on the marketplace. 174
Further, the ACA provides that only individuals earning between
100% and 400% of the FPL will be eligible for tax credits if they pur175
chase health insurance through the marketplace.
For states with
the least generous income thresholds for pre-ACA Medicaid eligibility, a significant portion of poor citizens will be left “with neither a
government healthcare program nor government assistance to pur176
This gap will undoubtedly raise
chase private health insurance.”
questions of equity and fairness, as similarly situated individuals in
different states receive widely disparate treatment in terms of
healthcare availability.
It might be argued that individuals left without health coverage in
non-expanding states could petition their state-elected officials or use
the political process to elect new representatives. Federalism’s political accountability may, however, be lost due to the ACA’s blend of
177
Thus,
federal and state involvement in the Act’s implementation.
citizens in non-expanding states may place the blame for their lack of
coverage on the federal government rather than the state officials

171
172
173
174

175
176
177

See FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, supra note 19.
See Ruger, supra note 85 (stating that § 1115 of the Social Security Act allows for such
varying degrees of eligibility among the states).
See generally R A M I R E Z D E A R E L L A N O & W O L F E , supra note 75.
See Huberfeld et al., supra note 52 at 85 (finding that the “donut hole” exists in light of
the Supreme Court declaring that the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care
Act was unconstitutional).
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 36(B).
Huberfeld, Leonard & Outterson, supra note 52, at 86.
See id. (“One apparent political goal of the tax-credit challenge is to deny coverage to millions of additional people, while laying the blame for ACA’s failures on the federal tax
code rather than state officials who opt out of Medicaid expansion or a state exchange.”).
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who elected to opt-out of the Medicaid expansion. Low-income citizens in non-expanding states may, therefore, become even more exposed than they were prior to the ACA’s implementation and have
no real means of expressing their grievances through the political
178
process.
Non-expanding states may also face serious financial detriments
for declining to participate in the expansion. First, federal taxes taken from states that have decided not to expand Medicaid will be used
179
to fund the expansion in other states.
A study done by the Commonwealth Fund found that every state that does not participate in
the Medicaid expansion would see a net loss in federal funds by the
180
For example, if Texas ultimately decides not to particiyear 2022.
pate in the Medicaid expansion, the state will forgo “an estimated
181
When the amount of
$9.58 billion in federal funding by 2022.”
federal taxes paid by Texas residents is taken into account, “the net
182
cost to taxpayers in the state in 2022 will be more than $9.2 billion.”
Similarly, Florida taxpayers would loose more than five billion dollars,
Georgia taxpayers nearly $4.9 billion and South Dakota taxpayers approximately $224 million. 183 The citizens in non-expanding states
will, therefore, be paying taxes without receiving any of the benefits
that states participating in the expansion, or a premium assistance
plan, receive.
Increases in federal funding also create direct benefits by bolstering state economies and providing the means necessary for better184
Thus, even if a given state does not value “the
ment projects.
health and health system benefits” of expanding Medicaid, the state
should value the expansion “as a source of [funding] that benefits
185
the state’s economy.”
Further, hospitals in states that have decided not to expand will
lose federal funding meant to offset the cost of treating uninsured
patients, since all citizens were expected to gain health insurance un178
179
180
181
182
183
184

185

See id. (Noting that under the ACA, “low-income individuals in Medicaid opt-out states
with federal exchanges will be even more exposed”).
See Sherry Glied & Stephanie Ma, How States Stand to Gain or Lose Federal Funds by Opting
In or Out of the Medicaid Expansion, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 2 (Dec. 2013).
See id. at 4 (“In every case, choosing not to participate in the [Medicaid] expansion
[under the ACA] generates a net loss of federal funds.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 3 (arguing that such funds provide greater flexibility in state budgets by subsidizing Medicaid costs and allowing that money to be spent on other public works projects).
Id.
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der the ACA. These Disproportionate Share Hospital (“DHS”) programs, which pay out about $22 billion annually, will be reduced by
186
nearly $18.1 billion between 2014 and 2020. Low-income individuals, who are statutorily exempt from the individual mandate, will remain uninsured absent affordable state subsidized health insurance,
and remain the “primary beneficiaries of uncompensated hospital
187
care.” This means that “hospitals in non-expansion states . . . could
face substantial erosion of DSH funds despite seeing little or no
188
To
change in the amount of uncompensated care they provide.”
recoup the loss of DSH funds, “hospitals could seek
to . . . [limit] . . . uncompensated care or, most likely, pass nontrivial
189
Thus, non-expanding states will
costs on to the privately insured.”
likely leave a significant uncompensated-care burden on hospitals.
VI.IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE AND “FEDERALISM BY WAIVER”
As the preceding Part articulates, § 1115 waivers can clearly benefit both the federal and state governments. In fact, the overall success
of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion may depend on negotiations between state and federal actors. However, the implications of this sys190
tem of “federalism by waiver” reach far beyond the provisions of
the ACA. Many scholars debate the propriety of allowing states to
negotiate the terms of cooperative spending programs and it is clear
that this debate will only increase in the wake of Sebelius. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius represents the first time the
Supreme Court has struck down federal legislative action taken pur191
suant to the Spending Clause on Tenth Amendment grounds. Previously, the Court has made “little effort . . . to protect the states when
Congress uses its power under the Spending Clause to influence state
192
affairs.” This is likely due to the fact that federal legislatures could
“point to the state’s voluntary decision to accept the funds” as indica186

187
188
189
190

191
192

See James A. Graves, Medicaid Expansion Opt-Outs and Uncompensated Care, 3 6 7 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2 3 6 5 , 2 3 6 5 (2012), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/
NEJMp1209450.
See id. at 2366.
Id.
Id. at 2367.
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Healthcare Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications, (University of Michigan Public Law a n d L e g a l T h e o r y Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 294, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161599.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (holding that the
Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act is unconstitutional).
Note, Federalism, Political Accountability, and the Spending Clause, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1420 (1994).
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tive of the states’ acceptance of federal legislative action. 193 The
Sebelius Court, as previously noted, found the states’ ability to make a
“voluntary decision” lacking under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
and therefore held that the provision was unconstitutionally coer194
cive. The Supreme Court’s attempt to safeguard the federal model
protected under the Tenth Amendment may, however, have unforeseen consequences for joint federal and state programs as waiver applications rise. The Sebelius holding is likely to provide states with
significantly greater bargaining power in the realm of cooperative
195
federal-state programs due to an increase in waiver applications. In
fact, the § 1115 waivers that have been approved, or are being considered, by CMS provide a clear example of increased state leverage
when negotiating with the federal government.
196
When, as with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, “federal funding
conditions are phrased in highly discretionary terms,” an administration can be expected to grant more waivers—especially when such
waivers “serve [the administration’s] substantive policy prefer197
ences.”
An administration’s policy preferences are not, however, the only
198
crucial variable.
Each waiver granted by the federal government
stems from “an iterative, negotiated process, in which the state holds
199
In fact, states have the major ada number of important cards.”
vantage of being able to opt out of a federal program entirely if the
federal government declines to negotiate or waive rules the states
200
find objectionable. Thus, federal officials will be inclined to grant
state waivers so that as much of cooperative programs as possible can
be salvaged.
There are, however, concerns over the desirability of this “waiver
regime.” First, there is a concern that the waivers will lead to a rise in
201
Further, some liberal critics believe that
“picket fence federalism.”
193
194
195

196

197
198
199
200
201

Id.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2635.
See Ruger, supra note 85, at 369 (“[W]aivers offered motivated states the chance to bargain for policy discretion and simultaneously obtain a more generous financial deal from
the federal underwriter.”).
See id. a t 36 6–69 (explaining that, for the expanded Medicaid program, the federal
government acts primarily as fiscal underwriter and broad standard- setter, leaving
much discretion and responsibility for implementation to the states).
Bagenstos, supra note 190, at 4.
See id. at 5.
Id.
See id.
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as a Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1225, 1227 (2001)(explaining that the idea behind picket fence federalism is “that
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the waivers will lead to statutory erosion. 202 There are, however, many
advantages to this phenomenon of “federalism by waiver,” and despite real concerns, the practical benefits of waivers are likely to out203
weigh the costs.
A. Criticisms
The first concern stemming from a rise in waiver applications is
that state officials with the power to negotiate waivers will not be “policy generalists” elected by state citizens, but rather expert-bureaucrats
who specialize in relevant policy arenas, a phenomenon known as
204
It has been suggested that this form of
“picket fence federalism.”
federalism is undesirable because of its potential to undermine
“comprehensive, cross-program planning and budgeting” 205 and “the
power of [democratically] elected policy generalists . . . to control
206
The fear is that waivers, such as the
state and local government.”
recently proposed § 1115 Medicaid waivers detailed above, could encourage the formation of alliances between “federal- and state-level
subject-matter expert bureaucrats, who join together to overcome re207
sistance to a federal program’s goals from politicians and generalist
208
agency officials at the state level.” Furthermore, many liberal critics
of the waiver regime claim that the waivers have undermined, and
will continue to, “undermine hard-won statutory requirements that
would otherwise bind states to provide important services to less privi209
leged and empowered individuals and communities.” Critics argue
further that states may attempt to use waivers to reduce spending on
cooperative programs created to protect vulnerable populations dur-

202
203
204
205

206
207
208

209

state and federal agency experts within the same specialty—the ‘posts’ in the
’fence’—often share more in common with each other than they do with the level of
government by which they are employed”).
See Bagenstos, supra note 190, at 9.
Id.
Hills, supra note 201.
Id. at 1238 (describing the potential of picket fence federalism to lead to “piecemeal
policy-making by bureaucratic fiefdoms . . . without any coordination and prioritization of the various policies across different areas of policy specialization”).
Id. at 1240.
Such politicians include governors, state legislators, mayors, city councillors, and
county commissioners. Id.
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver after the Helathcare Case, in THE HELATHCARE
CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 232 (Nathaniel Persily,
Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison eds., 2013). These politicians include governors, state legislators, mayors, city councillors, and county commissioners. Id.
Bagenstos, supra note 190, at 9.
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ing recessions, “ the worst possible time, from a programmatic per210
spective, to cut aid to poor people.”
B. Benefits of “Federalism by Waiver”
Despite such consequences, the overall effect of an increase in
waiver grants will likely be positive. First, with respect to “picket fence
federalism,” the “benefits of [maintaining] elected generalists’ power,
especially in the context of intergovernmental programs, are less selfevident than the benefits with respect to comprehensive planning
211
and budgeting.” There is clear value in having individuals who are
highly knowledgeable and educated with respect to a particular policy area making decisions. Further, the bureaucratic alliance can actually work to the advantage of political generalists. This is because
“subject-matter experts in the federal bureaucracy, supporting their
allies in state government, can work to overcome the resistance of
212
Further, the
generalist federal officials to state-level innovations.”
lack of available alternatives to the federalism by waiver framework
213
could easily defeat the statutory erosion argument. If states are not
given the option to apply for a waiver of federal spending conditions,
a state may simply refuse compliance, as “[f]ederal agencies are unlikely to terminate funding for relatively minor violations of the rules
214
Alternatively, with more complex
governing a spending program.”
spending programs, such as Medicaid or the No Child Left Behind
215
A clear
Act, states may decide to opt out of the program entirely.
waiver system provides a mechanism for federal agencies to engage
states before they depart from the strict requirements of funding
statutes, to negotiate for provisions that preserve the key goals—
as the administration sees it—of the statutes at issue, and to do so in a
216
context that preserves a measure of public accountability.
Further, with the waiver process as a clear option, any disregard of
governing rules will justify enforcement actions that might not be
210
211
212
213
214

215
216

Id.
Hills, supra note 201, at 1240.
Bagenstos, supra note 190, at 6.
See id. at 9.
Id. (noting that “third-party private enforcement of [governing] rules have been increasingly closed off by the Supreme Court’s restrictive private-right-of-action jurisprudence.”). See also Ruger, supra note 85, at 373 (explaining that “the federal circuit courts have held almost uniformly that Medicaid’s equal access provision and
other statutory terms do not contain the sufficient rights-creating language to provide a foundation for private enforcement”).
Bagenstos, supra note 190, at 11.
Id. at 9.
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triggered by the substance of a state’s violation in and of itself.217
With Medicaid, for example, CMS has published detailed criteria for
assessing waiver requests to provide states with advanced notice.218
Another advantage of providing readily accessible criteria is that state
and federal officials can more easily be held accountable for their de219
cisions.
For complex spending programs, a “waiver regime can
provide a safety valve that preserves conditional spending programs at
the same time that it relieves states of some of the obligations im220
Thus, without waivers, statutory erosion would
posed by them.”
likely still occur and to a much greater degree as programs that benefit the less privileged are completely extinguished.
Finally, one of federalism by waiver’s greatest benefits is that it
provides a powerful tool to negotiate a balance between national
standards and local variation “but with lower stakes . . . than a regime
that imposes strict statutory standards on states and provokes them to
221
Such “exchallenge those standards on constitutional grounds.”
perimentation” can lead to more effective and efficient programs at
both the national and state level.
CONCLUSION
While some states may ultimately decide to expand their Medicaid
programs, many remain in staunch opposition and are unlikely to
provide health insurance to their low-income citizens according to
the terms of the ACA. For these states, negotiating a premium assistance model through a § 1115 waiver may be a viable option, as complete refusal to expand Medicaid or pursue an alternate program will
mean the loss of substantial federal funding and will likely cause a net
reduction in state budgets.
The premium assistance model’s overall cost-effectiveness is presently unknown, since costs will be shaped in the short run and over
the long term by factors such as “market rates in the exchanges—
which may decrease with competition for new enrollees—as well as
Medicaid’s reimbursement rates—which may increase to convince

217
218

219
220
221

Id. at 10.
See Home & Community-Based Services 1915(c), MEDICAID.GOV, http://www.medicaid.
gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/by-topics/long-term-services-and-supports/
home-and-community-based-services/home-and-community-based-services-1915-c.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2014).
See Bagenstos, supra note 190, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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more providers to treat millions added to the program.” 222 Further,
since the federal government will be “footing the bill” for expanded
state Medicaid programs during the first three years, it is unclear
whether an expansion through the exchanges will cost the states
more over the long term. Any increase in costs associated with
providing private insurance rather than expanding Medicaid is,
however, very unlikely to cause more harm to state budgets than
the complete loss of all federal funding associated with the refusal
to participate in any form of “expansion.” Thus, not only will the
ACA’s goal of providing health insurance to all United States citizens be thwarted, b u t taxpayers in states refusing both the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion and an alternate “expansion” through a § 1115
waiver will likely suffer substantial adverse financial consequences
in the long-term. Pursuing some form of an “expansion” will,
therefore, benefit both states and the federal government by furthering the ACA’s objectives and generating funding states can use
to provide health insurance coverage to low-income citizens while
also improving state economies. Finally, although an increase in
waiver applications has the potential to alter the structure of federalism as applied to joint federal and state programs, the overall effect of a rise in waiver activity is likely to be positive.

222

Premium Assistance in Medicaid, supra note 138.

